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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates possible negative effects of the 2002 US steel safeguards on 
productivity of Eurozone steel companies. The analysis is based on an extensive 
literature which predicts that exporting firms not only are bigger and more 
productive, but also that exporting itself has positive effects, improving efficiency and 
leading to better utilization of firm resources. The paper investigates a large sample 
of EU-13 steel producing firms, in the 1998 - 2005 period. Using three methods of 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimation among which the Olley-Pakes 
semiparametric estimator, we first calculate the productivity levels of companies, and 
then check for any unusual fluctuation in this performance variable. We find that in 
2002 there has been a significant drop in TFP. The paper is an invitation for further 
research in this field, given the possible important effects of safeguard measures on 
exporters.  
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1.  Introduction 
The WTO and its predecessor the GATT are widely acknowledged for their successful 
efforts in reducing trade barriers. Over the last rounds of negotiations a significant 
liberalization of trade negotiations has been achieved, with important reductions in 
tariffs and the set up of a rule-based trading system. Among these rules there are 
inevitably also instruments that create import restrictions, albeit when very strict 
conditions are met. The Safeguard measure is one of them, allowed in case a sudden 
increase in imports is threatening to cause serious injuries to a national industry 
(WTO, 2009). Governments are thus allowed to protect their producers by requesting 
a reduction in the imported products, for example by setting up quotas.  
 
Among the most notable safeguards measures introduced in the last decade is one by 
the US government. In the beginning of 2002, it imposed trade restricting safeguards 
on certain steel products, after a well organized lobbying campaign of the 
corresponding national industry. Despite the protests of US trade partners and the 
concern of a WTO established panel investigating the legality of the procedure, the 
safeguards were in place for almost two years, affecting among others a multitude of 
EU steel producers. So far there has been little research done measuring the negative 
effects of these safeguards. 
 
In this paper we choose to follow the recent trend in trade related literature, mainly 
looking at firm productivity levels of exporters. The motivation behind this paper is to 
broaden the understanding of how exporting can influence one firms’ productivity. As 
suggested by previous research in this area, companies are heterogeneous and only 
the most productive can enter foreign markets. However, some maintain that not only 
is there evidence of self selection, but also that firms gain efficiency and improve their 
performance as a result of exporting. This implies that exporting per se generates 
beneficial learning effects. If one believes in this learning-by-exporting phenomenon, 
it is interesting to see what happens to firms if suddenly exports are restricted. 
Furthermore, this could provide a new argument for restricting the use of safeguards, 
as they might be detrimental to the existing learning platforms that are beneficial and 
provide synergy effects for exporting firms.  
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Keeping in mind the 2002 and 2003 US steel safeguards, we will analyze whether 
there have been any changes in the productivity of European steel companies. Based 
on the argument that exporting is beneficial for companies, improving their 
productivity, this paper tries to explore whether there has been a decrease in the 
productivity of Eurozone steel producers in the period when these safeguards were in 
place. 
 
In order to investigate this question, we will first present some EU steel industry 
characteristics and the impact of safeguards on steel trade flows in Section 2. Section 
3 gives an overview of the existing literature on exports and firm productivity. 
Section 4 describes the methodology used, including data description and results 
obtained. Section 5 discusses the results and presents some policy implications.  
Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The EU steel industry and US safeguard measures 
As it is important to understand the condition under which the safeguards had to be 
implemented, this section will provide a short description of the European steel 
industry. Moreover, a short review of the US 2002 trade policy decision will be given, 
to assess the restrictiveness of safeguards and their impact on EU steel producers.  
 
2.1 Description of EU steel industry 
The European steel industry is one of the most competitive and cost-efficient sectors 
of the EU economy. Established in almost all Member States, it represents roughly 
2.5% of the total value of industry production, and an added value of 49 billion Euro 
in 2005. The sector is also a significant employer, accounting for 1.25% of total 
employment in EU manufacturing (European Commission, 2009). Moreover, while 
the industry was the largest steel producer in the world until 2001, it has been 
overtaken by China and currently produces 16% of world output. The EU steel 
industry is also the third biggest exporter; at the same time it is the first world 
importer, since it lacks sufficient primary raw materials, iron ore and cooking coal. 
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The EU steel sector has enjoyed a leading position until recently due to a significant 
restructuring process throughout the eighties and nineties. The restructuring not 
only deregulated and privatized the industry by removing government intervention, 
but also made significant R&D investments – 2.5 billion Euro subsidies between 
1995-1999. This allowed for innovation and development of new technologies which 
in turn increased productivity and cost efficiency. As suggested by the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) “a 20 percent production growth in the last decade was 
accompanied by a 40 percent reduction in the labour force down to about 270 
thousands compared to one million employed in the early seventies” (Vandenbussche 
& Zarnic, 2006). Moreover, steel producers had to overcome environmental 
challenges introduced by the EU, aiming at incorporating the Emission Trading 
Scheme and the REACH chemicals regulation. Thus, remaining competitive is a crucial 
priority for steel plants, increasing quality and adapting new production processes 
while reducing production costs and polluting emissions.  
 
2.2 US policy impact 
Amidst a flat world demand and sluggish economic conditions, in March 2002 the US 
introduced a safeguard protection measures for its steel sector, lasting until the end 
of 2003. The decision is attributable to the national industry, which petitioned for 
protection due to its inability to restructure and to achieve cost competitiveness. 
Moreover, following the GATT/WTO liberalization agreement, the US steel industry 
experienced a series of bankruptcies and an increase in imports. The safeguards 
included a quota limit of 5-6 million tonnes and a 15 to 30 percent tariff on 14 
categories of steel imported products. The measures were imposed after the US 
International Trade Commission (ITC) assessed the competitiveness of US steel 
producers. The ITC concluded that recent growth in imports was damaging the US 
steel industry, blaming France, Great Britain and Italy for selling their products at 
dumped prices  (Vandenbussche & Zarnic, 2006). 
 
The safeguards, although condemned by EU, China, Japan, Korea and eventually by 
the WTO Appellate Body, had a significant impact on the economic environment of 
European steel producers. The restriction which initially had the aim of protecting 
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the US market, created a so called domino effect. According to the European 
Confederation of Iron and Steel Producers (Eurofer), the US safeguards lead to the 
“opening or imposition of some 16 safeguard and anti-dumping actions world-wide 
as a direct reaction to the effective closure of the US market” (Eurofer, 2003). 
Notorious examples are the safeguards introduced by China and Poland as a response 
to the US safeguards. Moreover, Eurofer underlines in its annual report that, due to a 
long-standing stable presence of EU steel producers in the US market, it was those 
firms in particular that got hit the hardest by these safeguards. Besides the reduction 
of exports, the EU producers faced an increase in imports since now the market was 
being invaded by diversion of trade flows from the US. However, the shock was 
cushioned by a prompt action of the European Commission, which took appropriate 
measures for stabilizing the market against any significant surge in imports, while 
maintaining free trade. Nonetheless, as Eurofer signals, “the wave of protectionism 
set off worldwide by the US measures significantly undermined free trade in steel and 
highlighted the importance of full compliance with existing WTO rules” (Eurofer, 
2003). 
 
Figure 2.1 – Evolution of EU-15 trade flows 
 
Source: Vandenbussche and Zarnic (2006) 
 
For illustration purposes, we present trade flows of EU-15 indicating the evolution of 
both imports and exports of steel products. Figure 2.1 shows a slow increase in both 
the imports and exports of steel products over the 1999-2004 period, with a rather 
stable trade flow. However, a closer look at the EU’s main trading partners in Figure 
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2.2 shows clear indication of a decrease in steel exports to the US, which continues 
throughout 2002 and 2003. As a result of this sharp fall, the EU steel producers had to 
reroute their exports to countries like China. Moreover, the EU had to face a much higher 
supply from other steel exporters, such as Russia. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Evolution of EU-15 trade flows (main partners) 
 
Source: Vandenbussche and Zarnic (2006) 
 
Given the evidence of a significant impact of safeguards on EU steel trade flows, 
Vandenbussche and Zarnic (2005) investigated the existence of possible externalities 
of US trade protection policies on steel producers’ mark-ups. First the authors modify 
the reciprocal dumping model of Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) 
by introducing the possibility of imposing a safeguard tariff. This theoretical 
framework suggests two channels through which EU producers might get hurt by the 
tariff: import penetration and trade costs. Thus the mark-up will be negatively 
affected both by the level of the tariff and by the market share of EU steel companies. 
Having set up a theoretical framework, Vandenbussche and Zarnic (2005) empirically 
measure the adverse effect of US steel safeguards on the mark-ups of EU steel 
companies. The data consists of annual company accounts of steel producing firms 
over the 1995-2004 period. The results indicate that EU steel producers experienced 
a mark-up decrease of 11 percent on average during the imposition of safeguards. To 
increase robustness of the results, the authors perform a similar empirical analysis on 
a randomly selected group of firms that were not affected by US safeguards. Results 
confirm a lack of significant decrease in these mark-ups, thus strengthening their 
conclusions. Moreover, the authors find that the decrease in mark-ups was stronger 
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for single-product firms, with less diversified production. This suggest that multi-
product firms are affected less by adverse market shocks and are able to adapt easier 
to changes in trade frameworks. Moreover, the authors conclude that at least 
partially, EU steel exporters have absorbed the US safeguard tariffs  (Vandenbussche 
& Zarnic, 2006). 
 
Based on the evolution of EU trade flows in the 2002-2003 period, but also on the 
results of Vandenbussche and Zarnic, we will investigate further the potential 
externalities caused by the US safeguards. First however let us investigate the existing 
link between exports and firm productivity.  
 
3.  Theory 
In this section we will summarize the main findings concerning firm productivity and 
exports. The review begins with an explanation of the self selection mechanism, 
which is widely accepted among economists. Moreover, we also review papers 
looking for possible benefits from exporting in terms of higher productivity. This 
provides a basis for the assumption that a decrease in exports may generate a drop in 
TFP. 
 
3.1  Firm heterogeneity and export patterns (self selection mechanism) 
The standard trade theories introduced by Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin do not 
consider firms, but merely try to justify the exchange of products and services 
between two countries. Later models developed using the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic 
competition framework do include firms and aim at explaining large volumes of trade 
among countries with similar factors of production. In this context, firms were often 
considered symmetric across an industry as far as technology and productivity is 
concerned. Against all odds, this meant that anybody could technically export and 
that trade costs could easily be absorbed no matter what the revenue made abroad 
was. In the last two decades however, new empirical studies have identified a clear 
pattern regarding exporters, suggesting that firms are highly asymmetric. The 
availability of firm level data revealed that only a small percentage of firms within an 
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industry export, and they are not just a random sample of the whole population. On 
the contrary, the exporting firms are larger and more productive than those who 
serve exclusively national markets. The productivity advantage allows exporting 
firms to incur sunk costs, such as building new distribution networks, performing 
market research and modifying the product to better suit new markets. 
 
Among the first empirical researches that proved the relationship between size, 
productivity and international activity of firms is a series of papers by Bernard and 
Jensen (1995 and 1999). While their first paper proves that exporters are on average 
larger and more efficient, it is the second paper that provides richer evidence of self 
selection. Looking at an unbalanced panel of more than 50,000 US plants in the 
1984-1992 period, the authors find that even in a sample of small plants exporters 
are about 50 to 60 percent larger than non-exporters. Similarly, total employment 
and total shipments are twice as large for firms that manage to sell abroad than for 
those that do not. As far as productivity is concerned, labour is 12 to 24 percent more 
productive, which is only partially explained by the higher capital intensity relative to 
non-exporting firms. Moreover, the authors spot a difference in labour structure, with 
more non-production workers for exporting companies, but also a significant higher 
wage difference which applies to both production and non-production workers. A 
further look into the causal relationship indicates that exporters are larger, more 
productive and pay higher wages several years before exporting. Moreover, prior to 
embracing international markets, they grow at a higher rate than those which will 
not, confirming that good plants become exporters.  
 
Based on the work of Bernard and Jensen, Melitz (2003) creates a model of 
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms, which is consistent with the 
assumptions that exporting involves certain sunk costs. This model is further 
expanded by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), to explain the patterns found by the 
empirical researches as far as export and FDI patterns are concerned. The main 
findings of the model are that the decision to export or not will depend on several 
factors, including the firm productivity parameter, the value of sunk cost of exporting 
and the magnitude of variable cost. Moreover, using their framework one can 
determine productivity thresholds for producing and serving the national market, 
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exporting to other non-national markets and even partake in FDI activities.  These 
results are elegantly presented in the graph below, indicating the profit levels in each 
market as dependent on firm productivity factor. One could also imagine that the 
higher the sunk cost and variable cost are, the more productive a company ought to 
be in order to be active in a market. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Profit margins of exporters 
 
Source: Greenaway and Kneller (2004) 
 
Similar models checking for self-selection effects have been tested across a multitude 
of countries. Most of them have undeniable found that indeed there is a clear impact 
of productivity on whether a firm starts exporting or not. The most important ones 
include the work of Aw and Hwang (1995) on Taiwanese firm data, Kimura and 
Kiyota on Japanese firms,  Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) on firm data from 
Mexico, Colombia and Morocco, Bernard and Wagner (1997) on German enterprises, 
Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2004) on UK firms and Damijan, Polanec and 
Prašnikar (2004) on Slovenian data. For a substantial overview of the existing 
literature on exports and productivity we include a table from Greenaway and Kneller 
(2005) which summarizes the most notable papers in this area.3 
3.2 Learning by exporting 
Although the economic literature is positive about the strong causal relationship 
between firm size and productivity, there are reasons to believe that this relationship 
could go both ways. While we have seen that bigger firms are better suited to 
                                                 
3
 See Table A1 in the Appendix 
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overcome larger costs linked to exporting, it is not excluded that by exporting some 
companies actually gain in size and productivity consequently. Several reasons could 
justify the existence of learning-by-exporting effects. First of all, as Greenaway and 
Kneller suggest, “interaction with foreign competitors and customers provides 
information about process and product reducing costs and raising quality” 
(Greenaway & Kneller, 2005). Thus exporting allows firms to take advantage of the 
presence of spillovers encountered in more agglomerated regions and is especially 
relevant in the case of firms exporting to bigger and more significant markets. 
Secondly, exporting allows firms to profit from economies of scale, thus benefiting 
from potentially significant cost advantages and a boost in profits. Finally, fiercer 
competition in the international markets may force the firm to become more efficient 
and innovative. As Bernard and Jensen point out, “once they begin to sell abroad, 
firms must improve their performance to remain exporters” (Bernard & Jensen, 
1999).  
 
Based on these reasons, a set of empirical and theoretical studies have been 
undertaken in the last decade, which test for potential correlations between entry in 
new markets and productivity growth. Bernard and Jensen were among the pioneers 
of this strand of literature. Their paper on exceptional exporter performance made 
the step from correlation to causality by testing for both self-selection and 
learning-by-exporting effects. The authors perform a regression of the change in 
performance measure on initial export status, controlling for certain initial firm 
characteristics that might influence productivity. These characteristic include 
employment level, average wage, the ratio of non-production to total employment 
and other industry dummies.  
 
The authors find that over annual horizons exporting firms perform better as far as 
shipments and employment are concerned. However, they do not record any 
significant productivity growth differences. Labour productivity seems to be growing 
significantly slower than for non-exporters in the beginning, outperforming national-
only firms later on. Wage differences show mixed evidence as well, depending on 
whether one controls for plant characteristics. With additional variables, wages 
increase faster for first year exporters. The authors also indicate that wage growth is 
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explained by an increased share of white-collar workers but also a faster increase in 
the wage of blue-collar workers. Looking at longer periods, these differences seem to 
level off, thus any initial significant improvement in performance becomes small and 
insignificant with time. The benefits from exporting become difficult to identify and 
are mostly limited to higher employment rates.  
 
The results obtained by Bernard and Jensen do not support learning effects. However, 
a closer look at firm behaviour after entry explains the above trends. Looking at the 
degree of switching they realize that the process is relatively dynamic: in the period 
of one year 10% of firms enter new international markets while 17% exit. As the 
authors explain, “the large number of plants moving in and out of exporting means 
that initial export status is poorly correlated with subsequent exporting, especially at 
longer horizons” (Bernard & Jensen, 1999). Testing for only those who successfully 
continue exporting during longer periods does indicate significant employment, 
shipments and production worker wages differences compared to those who exit and 
re-enter the international markets. However, the authors find no evidence of 
significant productivity differences, which suggest that the effect of 
learning-by-exporting is not strong enough. There are however other important gains 
to be made when successfully exporting which might be due to expanded markets 
and thus economies of scale. Governments might consider the implications of exports 
on job creation and job stability in case of a successful performance throughout 
medium and long intervals of time. 
 
Despite the fact that Bernard and Jensen have strengthened the argument in favour of 
self-selection, their paper has changed the views of researchers, stimulating a series 
of investigations into whether a bi-causal relationship exists. Accepting that the new 
exporters are indeed much more productive than their non-exporting competitors, 
many researchers began testing whether the difference in productivity led these 
firms to become exporters, or it was the exporting experience that caused a surge in 
their productivity. The possibility that the argument runs both ways not only changed 
the perspective of economists, but also forced them to shift to different econometric 
models. The new methodology had to control for self-selection, which otherwise 
would exaggerate the existence of learning-by-exporting. Common methods applied 
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include instrumental variables (IV) by using GMM and matching techniques. While 
the IV method is relatively easy to implement, it does require having a valid 
instrument. Matching on the other hand is much more challenging, requiring the 
researcher to find for each exporter a perfect match among non-exporters. As 
suggested by Blundell and Costa Dias, this method is an “attempt to mimic the 
randomised control of the experimental setting but does so with non-experimental 
data and consequently places reliance on independence and/or exclusion 
assumptions”(Blundell & Costa Dias, 2002). Once the firms are matched, any 
difference in their performance can be attributed to learning effects. 
 
The outcomes of these numerous studies have often  been inconclusive; however they 
have proved to be significant for understanding firm export behaviour. Probably the 
first attempt to analyze entry and exit decision of firms with possible learning-by-
exporting implications was the research of Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998). 
Inspired by Bernard and Jensen’s paper, Clerides et al. first construct dynamic 
optimizing models checking for potential effects of learning-by-exporting on firm 
productivity trajectories and then examine the actual performance of Colombian, 
Mexican and Moroccan firms. The authors assume a monopolistic market, where 
companies face a downward sloping demand curve. However, they disregard any 
strategic interactions, assuming that each firm sees itself as too small to influence the 
behaviour of its competitors. They also set the marginal cost as constant with respect 
to output and the market. In this case, the presence of costs associated with exporting 
(transport and trade barriers) reduces the revenue from exporting, making both the 
foreign demand and the foreign marginal revenue below domestic levels. The gross 
profit from exporting is represented by the shaded area in Figure 3.2. The net profit is 
however even smaller, due to assumed start up costs which one pays to become an 
exporter. This formulation makes the decision of firms forward looking: the costs 
incurred must pay off at some point but it does not have to be in the first period of 
entry, making expectations and potential learning effects extremely important.  
 
The authors find that, given certain assumed exogenous shocks to demand and 
productivity, both entrants and exporters incur lower costs than the other two 
groups. Thus, in the presence of sunk costs, firms do have to become more productive 
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prior to entry. Moreover, before exiting a foreign market firms experience on average 
an increase in their costs. However, in the presence of learning effects, companies 
may accept larger expected costs when exporting, the incentives to export being 
higher. In this case, not only would less efficient firms start exporting, but they would 
also stay in the foreign markets for longer periods, despite potential losses. This 
prediction is extremely significant, since it suggests that one cannot evaluate the 
presence of learning effects from comparing the costs of exporters and non-exporters 
due to an increase in productivity dispersion among foreign market entrants. 
Otherwise said, “one has to examine the dynamic trajectory of costs; a single cross-
section will not do” (Clerides, Lach, & Tybout, 1998). 
 
Figure 3.2 – Gross operating profits from exporting 
 
Source: Clerides et al. (1998) 
 
Based on the theoretical simulations, Clerides et al. perform an empirical analysis, 
looking at the actual productivity trajectories of firms from Mexico, Colombia and 
Morocco. The results obtained can be called at most inconclusive, most of the 
trajectories obtained being in accordance with ‘no learning effects’ framework. Except 
for Colombian firms, where labour productivity increases for ongoing exporters, 
there is little evidence of strong learning-by-exporting effects. In fact, the authors find 
that negative cost shocks Granger cause higher expected returns from exporting, 
while exporting does not Granger cause reductions in marginal costs (Clerides et al., 
1998). 
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Despite a general acceptance of self-selection, there are several studies that do find 
clear indication of learning-by-exporting phenomena. Among these is the paper by 
Baldwin and Gu (2003) which explores the possible relationship between 
participation in foreign markets and firm productivity of Canadian manufacturing 
plants. The authors not only check for the existence of this linkage, but also examine 
the effect of export intensities on productivity levels. Using survey data for larger 
plants, which account for 95% of shipments, the model estimates the impact of the 
capital/labour ratio and export participation on labour productivity. Moreover, the 
authors use first differencing to remove plant specific effects such as managerial 
ability, which might potentially be correlated with the decision whether to export or 
not. Finally, industry dummies and plant size variables are added and the model is 
rewritten as to account for transition in export markets.  
 
The results obtained for Canadian manufacturing firms are in line with the self 
selection hypothesis: exporters are found to be around 15% more productive than 
non-exporters, while those that exit the foreign markets are on average 13% less 
productive than continuing firms (J. R. Baldwin & Gu, 2003). The authors find 
impressive differences between labour productivity of companies that export and 
those that do not, amounting to 5.2 percentage points. Controlling for plant size, the 
difference is still present, but slightly smaller at 4.9 percentage points. Total factor 
productivity (TFP) comparison also indicates a higher level for exporters, with a 
difference of 0.7 percentage points. The conclusion is that exporters are much more 
capital intensive, the pace of capital accumulation accounting for the difference 
between labour and total factor productivities.  
 
However, it is the outcome of learning-by-exporting estimation that is worth 
mentioning. In particular, Baldwin and Gu find that the plants which exit foreign 
markets do so because they are not able to keep up with the rest of firms. The 
continuers have on average higher labour productivity (5.6 percentage points) and 
TFP (0.8 percentage points). Nonetheless, comparing new entrants and continuers, 
the authors suggest that “entrants are more successful at acquiring or benefit more 
from new productivity-enhancing information than existing exporters” (J. R. Baldwin 
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& Gu, 2003). This could be seen as a catching up effect, which new entrants 
experience once they start exporting.  
Furthermore, the authors split their dataset into two periods and investigate the 
performance of Canadian plants separately in each of these periods. They conclude 
that the most productive firms from the first period have a higher chance of exporting 
in the second period. However, as a result of entry, their productivity seems to be 
accelerating even further. Furthermore, the paper suggests that some firms benefit 
from participation in foreign markets more than others. Young firms seem to have 
much more to gain, since they have less technology and innovation channels to begin 
with. Moreover, it matters whether the firm is domestic or foreign controlled. Those 
that are domestic-controlled have much more to gain from interaction with foreign 
markets, than the ones already controlled by foreigners.   
 
Besides the study of Baldwin and Gu, several other papers find evidence that 
participating in foreign markets does improve productivity.  
 
Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2004) aim at measuring the effects of exporting on a 
performance indicator, which is represented by the growth rate of employment, 
output, labour productivity and TFP. In order to determine this effect, the 
performance of an exporter has to be compared with its performance had it not 
started exporting. Since one can never know what could have happened if the firm 
had not entered a foreign market, the exporters should be compared to a firm that 
matches best its performance and characteristics prior to new market entry. This is 
done by using a probit model, which determines the probability of each firm to 
export, controlling for a set of observables such as TFP, size, ownership and wages. 
The exporting firm is then matched to a non-exporter with the closest propensity 
score (probability that it will start exporting). Thus one can be sure that the 
difference in firm performance is only due to exporting and not other factors.  This 
method is superior to a non-matched (random sample) comparison, since it 
eliminates potential biases related to comparison between firms with different 
characteristics (Girma et al., 2004). After firms are matched, the authors apply the 
Difference-In-Difference method which implies two main steps. First they take the 
difference in average growth rates of exporters before and after entry into the foreign 
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market, controlling for past performance, size, age, industry and time characteristics. 
Since this might not be enough to explain a rise in performance, the second step 
implies differencing the results obtained at the first step with the difference in the 
performance of the control group for the same period of time. According to Blundell 
and Costa Dias, this method removes common macro effects such as shocks or 
individual effects (Blundell & Costa Dias, 2002). 
 
The results obtained are in line with the self-selection hypothesis, however, they also 
suggest evidence of learning-by-exporting. While employment and output growth are 
significantly higher for exporters than for non-exporters in the entry year, all of the 
performance variables seem to have grown significantly faster than if the firms had 
not become exporters one year after entry in the foreign market. Moreover, while TFP 
growth is similar for both groups prior entry, on the entry year it becomes higher by 
1.6 percentage points for exporters, growing even further by an extra percentage 
point in the second year. These results prove that the matching procedure has been 
successful in finding proper control firms for each exporter and that indeed exporters 
have extra benefits to gain by entering into foreign markets. Besides the effects of 
exporting, the authors check whether export intensity has an effect on productivity 
growth. They conclude that a 10% increase in the share of exporting capacity raises 
productivity by 2.1 percentage points, again suggesting important learning effects  
(Girma et al., 2004). 
 
Another paper drawing on productivity growth through exporting includes the work 
of Greenaway and Kneller (2004). The empirical methodology used is similar to that 
in Girma el al. (2004). However, in addition to calculating post entry effects, the 
authors also try to identify what influences the probability of market entry. Using a 
probit model, they regress the decision to export (dummy variable) on a set of 
determinants consistent with the existing theory but also with the assumption that if 
learning effects exist, they should be less evident in industries that already are open 
to exports. The model tests for the impact of firm productivity, industry sunk costs 
(minimum TFP of the new export market entrants), size (log of employment), human 
capital (log of wage) and R&D intensity on export status. Furthermore, industry 
agglomeration is added and together with two measures of international trade for 
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capturing how open the sector is to foreign competition. Starting with a basic model, 
the authors add trade exposure variables, an FDI measure and a set of industry 
dummies. 
 
The results of this study are consistent with the self selection effect, the probability of 
entry being correlated to size, TFP, wage level and the incurred suck costs. 
Furthermore, once all the variables are added, the probability of entry is increasing in 
human capital and size, while TFP seems to be insignificant. As far as the industry 
variables are concerned, the higher the presence of foreign exporters, the higher the 
probability of export market entry. The authors suggest that market entry is higher in 
agglomerated regions due to several factors such as the co-location of support 
industries, deeper labour markets and intense expertise sharing among market 
participants. Moreover, the presence of foreign firms has an adverse effect on export 
activity of domestic firms. As Greenaway and Kneller suggest, “if those [foreign] firms 
have superior technology it is less likely that domestic firms will be able to compete 
in the foreign firms’ own domestic market and are less likely to have foreign sales of 
any form” (Greenaway & Kneller, 2004). 
 
This paper also reports learning-by-exporting effects, suggesting that exporters’ 
productivity grows on average 2.9 percent faster than that of non-exporters. 
Furthermore, employment, output and labour productivity are significantly higher for 
those engaging in export activities. Using interaction terms, the authors find that TFP 
growth of exporters is lower in industries with high domestic R&D levels. This 
suggests that, depending on the industry, the potential learning opportunities by 
going abroad can vary. Moreover, trade openness also affects one’s learning-by-
exporting capabilities. If the domestic market is already open to foreign products, 
exporting might not have a significant impact on a company’s productivity. 
 
A final paper investigating whether exporting can boost firm productivity is one by 
Greenaway, Gullstrand and Kneller (2005). The authors make use of an extensive 
dataset comprising over 3,500 Swedish manufacturing firms for a period of almost 20 
years. The empirical results are even more interesting since Sweden is an extremely 
open country with trade revenues amounting to 60% of its GDP. Moreover, Swedish 
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companies are very trade oriented, 85% of them being active in foreign markets. The 
authors use a similar estimation method as in Girma et al. (2004) and Greenaway and 
Kneller (2004), mainly matching and DID, since these perform much better than just 
comparing the exporters with a randomly selected group of non-matched non-
exporters.  
 
The results provided show no significant difference between exporters and non-
exporters in the period preceding the new market entry. This is again a result of the 
methodology used, suggesting that the companies have been properly matched. 
Furthermore, while exporting does increase productivity, it does not improve it in a 
statistically significant way. The authors also provide matched DID results for other 
performance indicators. Firm size measured as labour employment and the average 
wage do show a significant increase when entry occurs. The authors conclude that the 
high degree of international exposure made Swedish companies competitive enough 
to squeeze out those firms that normally would only serve the national market. 
Putting it in the Melitz framework, “Increased export opportunities in that model 
encourage entry of new firms into the market (through profit opportunities), raising 
the minimum productivity requirement below which firms exit the industry” 
(Greenaway, Gullstrand, & Kneller, 2005). To support this evidence, Greenaway et al. 
(2005) indicate that the majority of non-exporting Swedish firms came from a few 
industries characterised by high transport costs associated with exporting. 
Furthermore, the majority of firms that start exporting in the analyzed period are 
usually young and highly productive, suggesting that they replace the older less 
productive non-exporting companies. 
 
To conclude, we have discussed a number of papers investigating possible learning 
effects correlated with exporting activity. While some researches find clear evidence 
that exporting firms do have a significantly higher productivity growth, others find 
little evidence of such an effect. More recent empirical studies emphasize that 
learning-by-exporting is only inherent to certain industries. In particular, Greenaway 
and Kneller (2004) and Greenaway et al. (2005) suggest that national firms active in 
industries already exposed to outside competition have little to gain from exporting. 
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Moreover, R&D intensity of one’s national industry has a negative impact on the 
increase in productivity growth at the level of new exporters.  
 
As suggested by the literature review, exporting may have positive learning effects on 
productivity. Since the implementation of the US safeguards in 2002, we have seen in 
section 2 that the EU steel producers have been able to export less goods to the US in 
2002 and 2003, instead rerouting their production to developing markets like Russia 
and China. This has altered the competitive platform in which European firms have 
been acting, possibly setting them back. Moreover, given that the decrease in EU steel 
exports to the US caused a significant decrease in mark-ups of steel producers and 
applying the described literature, we have good reasons to believe that these 
safeguards had possible negative effects also on the productivity of European 
companies. 
 
4.  Empirical analysis 
This section provides a description of the methodology used to calculate both TFP 
levels and the yearly change in productivity. Moreover, a description of the dataset 
and the obtained results will be presented. 
 
4.1  Methodology 
To evaluate the presence of a potential drop in productivity due to US safeguard 
measures, it is necessary to compute total factor productivity values. The history of 
TFP estimation dates back to the seminal paper by Solow (1957). Since output growth 
includes both growth in factors of production (capital and labour) and the increase in 
efficiency of utilization of these factors, Solow uses a Cobb-Douglas production 
function to separate these two. (Solow, 1957) Following Van Beveren (2008), we will 
replicate the method, adding an additional variable representing material costs. The 
production function takes the following form:  
 
mlk
ititititit MLKAY
                                                  (4.1) 
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where itY  represents the aggregate output of a firm i  in period t , itit LK ,  and itM are 
the stock of physical capital and costs of labour and materials. itA  is then the Hick-
neutral efficiency level of firm i  in period t , which unlike the other variables, is not 
observed by the researcher (Van Beveren, 2008). A simple logarithmic 
transformation of (4.1) allows us to rewrite the production function in a more 
accessible way, so that: 
 
ititmitlitkit mlky   0                                  (4.2) 
 
where small letters represent natural logarithms and productivity level is computed 
as: 
 
ititA   0)ln(                                                  (4.3) 
In (4.3) 0  represents the mean efficiency level of firms, while it  is a firm and time 
specific productivity.  The latter one can be further divided into two components, one 
of which is observable ( it ), while the other one (
q
itu ) is considered an i.i.d. process 
accounting for unexpected deviations from the mean (Van Beveren, 2008). 
Productivity can thus be computed as the exponential of it , where: 
 
itmitlitkitit mlky 
ˆˆˆ                                         (4.4) 
 
We use this estimation as the basis for computing firm level TFP, looking for any 
particular spikes, plunges or any other unusual changes in its values.  
 
Pooled OLS estimation 
The first analysis that we perform is regressing (4.2) using pooled OLS. This method 
basically calculates total factor productivity values by applying (4.4). While pooled 
OLS is very easy to apply, it also casts doubt on the unbiasedness of obtained 
coefficients. The existing literature signals that this method of TFP estimation may be 
violating two important assumptions, mainly endogeneity of input choices (or 
simultaneity bias) and selection bias.   
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As far as the simultaneity bias is concerned, OLS requires that production inputs 
(capital, labour and materials) are chosen in an exogenous way, thus independently 
from total factor productivity. However, the recent papers on exports and 
productivity growth, among which Baldwin and Gu (2003), do indicate possible 
relationship between TFP and the levels of factors of production. Capital intensity is 
in particular suggested to be influenced by firm characteristics, including 
productivity. In this case OLS will provide biased coefficients due to serial correlation 
in it  , which implies that an increase in productivity will be followed by a surge in 
production factors (Van Beveren, 2008). According to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), 
performing OLS under these conditions will underestimate the effect of capital on 
TFP, providing biased coefficients. Common solutions for eliminating this bias include 
using fixed effects or instrumenting the change in inputs with the lagged value of 
inputs (Wooldridge, 2003). 
 
The selection bias relates to entry and exit decisions of firms in and out of the market, 
which pooled OLS does not take into account. We have seen in the literature review 
that an exit is preceded by a drop in productivity, which also might influence the 
amounts of capital, labour and materials which the firm invests in. Given high entry 
and exit, especially over longer periods of time, using a balanced panel will lead to 
biased results. According to Van Beveren (2008), OLS method of estimation will 
generate in this case a negative correlation between it  and itK , underestimating the 
capital coefficient. Olley and Pakes find that “going from a balanced panel to the full 
sample (entry and exit are allowed) more than doubles the capital coefficient and 
decreases the labour coefficient by 20%” (Olley & Pakes, 1996). Possible methods of 
dealing with this bias include using Olley-Pakes estimation, described further on. 
 
Fixed Effects estimation 
The fixed-effects method is one of the estimations that provide a solution for the 
endogeneity of input bias. This methodology assumes that it  is plant-specific and 
fixed over time, thus not influencing decision making when it comes to investment in 
new capital or labour.  
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Without further changes, equation (4.2) becomes: 
 
q
itiitmitlitkit umlky  0                                (4.5) 
 
Besides overcoming endogeneity of input bias, fixed-effects also eliminates selection 
bias, provided the entry or exit decisions are determined by the time-invariant plant 
specific factor i . Thus, using a balanced panel will not result in unbiased coefficients 
anymore. Nonetheless, many authors dislike this method, suggesting it 
underestimates the capital coefficient and in general provides biased estimations 
(Van Beveren, 2008). According to Wooldridge, fixed effects estimation places a 
“severe restriction on firm behaviour” by assuming that investment decisions are 
taken independently of firm productivity (Wooldridge, 2003). Better suited models 
for overcoming these problems have been developed in the recent years.  
 
Olley-Pakes estimation 
Probably the first to solve both selection and endogeneity biases when computing 
TFP is the paper of Olley and Pakes (1996). They develop a semiparametric estimator 
which deals with the correlation between idiosyncratic firm level productivity it  and 
input quantities by using investments as proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. 
Moreover, by introducing entry and exit rules, Olley-Pakes model corrects the 
selection bias as well. 
For employing the method is it crucial to comply with a set of assumptions. First of 
all, the model assumes that the only unknown variable is productivity, while other 
variables such as capital, labour, materials and investment can be observed by the 
researcher. Second of all the investment proxy should be monotonically increasing in 
productivity, conditional on the rest of variables. In practice this means that “an 
increase in investment or intermediate input use, conditional on a given level of 
capitalization, indicates a positive idiosyncratic shock” (Blalocka & Gertler, 2004). 
Moreover, this also implies that only positive investment levels can be considered, 
which should at least apply to a known subset of the sample (Olley & Pakes, 1996). 
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Starting with the Cobb-Douglas function and given capital levels which are only 
dependent on current and past firm performance, first investment values are 
calculated: 
 
ititit KKI )1(1                                                      (4.6) 
 
where  is the depreciation level of capital. We can thus express investment as a 
function of productivity and capital, so that ),( itittit kii  . Based on the assumption 
that investment is positive, lower case letters stand for logarithmic values of variables 
in capital. Given the fact that investment is increasing in productivity, we can 
construct its inverse function so that ),( itittit ikh , where 
  Rxxixh tt ),()(
1 . 
Thus, the production function becomes: 
 
q
ititittitmitlitkit uikhmlky  ),(0                               (4.7) 
 
The method continues following two stages. First (4.7) is used to estimate the 
coefficients for labour and materials, which will be consistent due to the fact that the 
error term is not correlated to the inputs anymore.  In the second stage non-linear 
least squares method is used to compute the coefficient of capital, accounting for 
prior period shocks (Van Beveren, 2008). 
The above mentioned methodologies will be used to compute total factor productivity 
measures.4 Once these are computed, we run a simple OLS regression on year 
dummies using TFP as dependent variable to check for a drop in the steel producers’ 
TFP in the period US safeguards were in place. 
 
4.2  Data description 
The estimation of productivity change is based on the Amadeus dataset provided by 
Bureau van Dijk. The data represents annual accounts of Eurozone companies active 
in the steel sector over the period 1998-2005. To control for the industry, we use the 
                                                 
4
 We  attempted to also use the Levinsohn-Petrin TFP estimation method, however this was unsuccessful due 
to lack of appropriate data on materials costs 
 
Victoria Purice, Exports and Firm Productivity - The effect of US steel safeguards 
 
24 
 
three digits SIC code 331 corresponding to primary metals, which includes steel 
works, steel pipes and rolling mills. Moreover, to allow for intertemporal comparison, 
we inflate the data using CPI deflator from DataStream. The broadest CPI is chosen, to 
account for increases in prices of energy but also other goods. Unfortunately we are 
unable to distinguish between exporting firms and non-exporters, since this 
information is collected only by tax authorities and is not publically available. Thus, 
when choosing data we only select medium, large and very large steel producers 
based on their output, as according to the literature the size is correlated to firm 
activity in foreign markets. 
 
Below we present an overview of the main variables used in the estimations together 
with their means and standard deviation, sorted by year. 
 
Table 4.1 – Main variables 
           
Year Turnover Capital Materials Labour Investment 
 Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
           
           
1998 14.63 94.49 4.25 27.66 8.42 46.82 2.15 17.98   
1999 13.01 75.55 4.33 27.34 7.33 39.14 1.96 16.07 1.07 6.75 
2000 16.25 96.20 4.30 26.38 8.84 50.11 2.02 16.30 0.76 4.92 
2001 14.12 80.75 3.96 22.18 8.16 45.68 1.98 16.35 0.51 4.91 
2002 13.25 74.97 3.45 20.71 7.14 46.39 1.73 13.74 0.50 2.94 
2003 13.57 69.84 3.16 19.44 7.28 41.03 1.59 12.24 0.35 2.98 
2004 16.32 77.53 3.26 19.98 8.71 44.75 1.55 10.59 0.80 6.54 
2005 15.69 75.62 3.16 19.74 8.38 44.54 1.48 10.48 0.42 3.29 
           
Note: All numbers in Million’s of Euro’s and inflated to 2005 levels.  
 
Physical output of firms is taken from Amadeus in the form of operating revenue. The 
value of capital is proxied by the book value of tangible fixed assets, while labour and 
total material costs are directly available from firm annual accounts. We also use 
investment values, which are calculated from yearly changes in capital levels, given 
Amadeus depreciation amounts. The data consists of 2,155 firms, from 13 EU Member 
States5, creating an unbalanced panel with over 17 thousand observations. 
 
                                                 
5
 A more extensive overview of the firm-country statistics is available in the Appendix, Table 2. 
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4.3  Results  
The main results obtained from pooled OLS, fixed effects and Olley-Pakes estimation 
methods are reported in Table 4.2. We report coefficients of all input factors for each 
individual estimation method. As the results clearly indicate, these coefficients vary 
depending on the method used. Moreover, as suggested by the existing literature, the 
simultaneity bias present in pooled OLS overestimates the labour coefficient at the 
expense of capital. The fixed effects method shows a significant but dangerously low 
impact of capital on output. This might be due to the fact that the assumption of no 
correlation between TFP and input choices is violated. Olley-Pakes however performs 
best as far as the impact of capital is concerned and according to previous researches 
provides consistent coefficients. 
 
Table 4.2 – Estimated coefficients 
    
Coefficients OLS Fixed Effects Olley – Pakes 
    
    
Capital 0.0410*** 0.0066* 0.0629*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0212) 
Labour 0.3538*** 0.3689*** 0.3317*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0067) (0.0107) 
Materials 0.5902*** 0.5509*** 0.5925*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0046) (0.0128) 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
After computing TFP values, we look at how productivity has evolved over the 1998-
2005 timespan. First, we generate a weighted productivity index to better visualize 
the behaviour of total factor productivity (See Graph 4.1). The index is formed by 
dividing each productivity value by the initial 1998 value. The graph shows generous 
year-to-year fluctuations. However, by eyeballing the weighted productivity index, we 
can see particularly high fluctuation especially in 2002 and 2005, when the TFP levels 
seem to drop to unusually low levels. Thus, we can only observe a decrease in the first 
year the safeguards were in place, with TFP starting to grow again in 2003. To 
confirm the suspicion of a significant decrease in productivity from 2001 to 2002, we 
test whether this decrease was significantly different from zero. 
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Graph 4.1 – Weighted productivity index 
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Below we present the changes in average productivity levels together with their 
standard errors. As indicated by Table 4.3, a productivity decrease was recorded in 
three of the analyzed years, namely in 2000, 2002 and 2005. If there was a negative 
impact of the decrease in exports, it seems to have disappeared in 2003, the second of 
the two years the safeguards were in place. Using a t-test, we see that only the 2002 
drop is significant across all methodologies.  
 
Table 4.3 – Estimated productivity levels 
    
Change in average TFP OLS Fixed Effects Olley – Pakes 
    
    
1998 – 1999 0.1238 0.0820 0.1178 
 (0.2184) (0.3603) (0.2176) 
1999 – 2000 -0.0988 -0.1355 -0.0958 
 (0.2130) (0.3241) (0.2168) 
2000 – 2001 0.2018 0.3392 0.1725 
 (0.2102) (0.3080) (0.2110) 
2001 – 2002 -0.3452* -0.6807** -0.3367* 
 (0.1958) (0.2940) (0.1923) 
2002 – 2003 0.1645 0.3959 0.1560 
 (0.2025) (0.3996) (0.1951) 
2003 – 2004 0.3183 0.6602 0.2926 
 (0.3576) (0.7144) (0.3406) 
2004 – 2005 -0.3678 -0.7407 -0.3526 
 (0.3075) (0.6143) (0.2922) 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Where standard errors in parentheses are calculated as: 
t
t
t
t
tt
NN
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1
2
1
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Given the obtained values, the next section elaborates on these results. Furthermore, some 
implications of safeguards are considered. 
 
5.  Discussion and policy implications 
As seen in the previous section, the results suggest that productivity of EU-15 firms 
included in the dataset decreased significantly in 2002. Both the Graph 4.1 and Table 
4.3 indicate a decrease in the total factor productivity of these companies. However, 
to answer the question whether it was precisely the US safeguards that determined 
this decrease, it is necessary to perform further calculations. One could think of 
extending the methodology by checking for differences between exporters and non-
exporters, or setting up a control group that has not been influenced by 2002 US 
safeguards.  
 
Unfortunately, the dataset does not allow for such extensions, due to the fact that 
Amadeus does not contain information on which firms are exporting and which are 
only active on national markets. Despite the fact that this constitutes a weakness of 
the research, the scope of the paper was an attempt merely to calculate productivity 
levels and investigate the presence of a potential decrease in this performance 
measure. This paper is thus an invitation towards further research into the effects of 
protectionist trade policies on foreign exporting firms. 
 
Nevertheless, this paper raises an important question, mainly do foreign safeguards 
blunt the best EU companies, considering that it is the biggest and most productive 
firms that engage in exporting? Despite the fact that this research has not been able to 
give a definitive answer, the question remains valid. Given that there are potentially 
significant policy implications and based on the results obtained by Vandenbussche 
and Zarnic (2006), it is necessary to consider the effects of such protectionist 
measures.  
 
First of all, while the country imposing the safeguards aims at protecting its own 
industry, it ends up hurting the foreign exporters. Vandenbussche and Zarnic (2006) 
have found an 11 percent decrease in mark-up of steel producers during the period in 
which safeguards were in place. However, as suggested by the authors, this policy 
was somewhat expected in 2001, giving the producers more time to prepare for a 
potential decrease in their exports. Moreover, the EU has taken the matter seriously 
by signing special agreements with Russia and Ukraine in order to offset the negative 
impact of these safeguards. Without such expectations and swift intervention from 
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European authorities, the effect of safeguards on mark-ups might have been much 
more drastic. 
Second of all, the safeguards might not only generate adverse externalities for the 
foreign producers, but also can change the dynamics of global trade patterns in a 
radical way. As suggested by Vandenbussche and Zarnic (2006), the US safeguards 
triggered domino effects. This concept was first introduced by Baldwin (1993) in the 
context of multilateral trade agreements, under which a change in the trade policy of 
one country can set off trade actions of other countries (R. E. Baldwin, 1993). In this 
case US safeguards forced EU steel companies to reroute their production to other 
countries, among which China. However, that triggered further safeguards from the 
Chinese government reacting to a significant increase in steel imports.  Thus, trade 
protectionist policies may affect not only the group aimed at, but also set free a series 
of unpredictable forces which could hurt a  much larger group of producers. 
 
Finally, one has to be aware that the negative impact of safeguards may affect 
different producers in different ways. As suggested by Vandenbussche and Zarnic 
(2006), based on the findings of Girma et al. (2004), the more a company exports to 
one country, the more it will be hit in case of a trade restriction with that country. 
Therefore, diversifying is an important strategy for companies trying to decrease 
dependency on certain markets. Moreover, it also seems that well diversified firms 
are able to adjust their mark-ups and  also productivity to unexpected shocks in the 
international trade environment (Vandenbussche & Zarnic, 2006). 
 
The policy implications which can arise given the mentioned patterns and relations 
between safeguards, producers’ mark-ups and possible also productivity are 
significant. Trade protection has been seen for a long time as a means of shielding 
one’s industry and offering it a somewhat unfair advantage. However, in this context, 
protectionist policies can not only be seen as a shield for local firms but also as a tool 
for hurting the foreign companies. As suggested by Vandenbussche and Zarnic 
(2006), “one country’s safeguard protection generates adverse externalities for its 
trading partners”. Thus, on the one hand, countries should be extremely careful when 
using such radical tools and consider the potential negative effects that might arise.  
 
On the other hand however, diversified exporting should be encouraged, since it can 
generate positive externalities and promote beneficial learning effects. 
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6.  Conclusion  
Safeguards and anti-dumping measures are becoming popular instruments for 
restricting imports, with US 2002 steel safeguards as a notorious example. These 
measures are often viewed as a means for protecting one’s industry, especially in 
extremely competitive environments. However, recent research including the paper 
of Vandenbussche and Zarnic (2006) suggests that not only are safeguards a way of 
ensuring an easier life for national producers, but also a potential tool for hurting 
foreign exporters. Our paper further investigates possible negative externalities of 
protectionist trade policies, taking a closer look at the behaviour of total factor 
productivity values of Eurozone steel producers between 1998 and 2005. 
 
The analysis is based on a comprehensive literature review, which explores possible 
correlations between firm heterogeneity and participation in foreign markets. 
Although there is extensive evidence that exporting firms are bigger and more 
productive than their non-exporting counterparts, some argue the relationship may 
run both ways. This implies that not only do firms need to be more efficient to enter 
new markets, they also may be gaining in productivity while exporting, thus pointing 
to the presence of learning effects. Recent papers investigating the causality of this 
relation are sometimes inconclusive or contradictory. While some do not register any 
TFP growth of firms while exporting, others find clear improvements in performance 
of exporters after entry. A third strand in the literature including Greenwood and 
Kneller affirms that the existence of learning effects depends on certain 
characteristics of an industry, being more pronounced where exporters have more to 
learn abroad than at home.  
 
Given potential serious implications of exporting on firm TFP growth, the paper 
investigates whether in the period in which US steel safeguards were in place there 
was a reduction in the performance of Eurozone steel producing companies. We  
approach this research question by calculating total factor productivity values using 
three widely known methodologies, mainly pooled OLS, fixed effects and a more 
recent semiparametric estimator approach by Olley and Pakes. Furthermore, we 
check for the significance of changes in firms’ TFP from year to year.  
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The results suggest that indeed, as suspected, productivity of Eurozone steel 
producing firm significantly decreases from 2001 to 2002. 
 
Given these results, it cannot be concluded that it was the safeguards that generated 
such adverse effects on firm TFP, which is a limitation of the paper. However, based 
on the previous research of Vandenbussche and Zarnic (2006) and the literature 
suggesting that exports improve productivity, it is not far-fetched to consider that a 
trade restriction may have negatively affected exporters. This paper is thus an 
invitation to further research the area, indicating promising results.  
 
As suggestions for future analysis of negative externalities of 2002 US safeguards, one 
should consider robustness checks. Possible examples include performing the same 
research while taking into account a control group or performing the analysis on 
exporters vs. non-exporters when the necessary data is available.  
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Table A.1 – Studies on exports and firm productivity  
 
 
Source: Greenaway et al. (2005) 
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Table A.2 – Firm-country statistic 
 
  
Country Number of Firms 
  
  
Austria 45 
Belgium 150 
Finland 28 
France 207 
Germany 438 
Greece 49 
Ireland 62 
Italy 682 
Luxembourg 9 
Portugal 38 
Slovenia 10 
Spain 373 
The Netherlands 64 
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